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 Joseph Granados was convicted of attempted murder, possession of a 
dangerous weapon by a restricted person, and criminal mischief.  (The Sentence, 
Judgment, Commitment is attached as Addendum A).  These charges arose from 
a shooting that occurred around 4pm.  Granados was also convicted of failure to 
stop at the command of a police officer, possession of a controlled substance, and 
possession of drug paraphernalia.  Those charges related to an incident that 
occurred later in the evening.  Although there was evidence connecting the car 
Granados was driving later in the evening to the earlier shooting, no witness 
identified him as the shooter.  This Court should reverse because the evidence of 




 Second, this Court should reverse all of the convictions because the judge 
decided to replace a juror over counsel’s objection and without questioning the 
juror first.  The trial court believed the juror was sleeping for portions of the trial. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
 Issue I: Whether the evidence of identity was sufficient to sustain 
convictions for attempted murder, possession of a dangerous weapon, and 
criminal mischief — the charges related to the shooting. 
 Standard of Review/Preservation: This Court “review[s] the trial court’s 
denial of the motion for directed verdict for correctness.”  Salt Lake City v. 
Valdez-Sadler, 2015 UT App 203, ¶ 6.  This issue was preserved.  R:1026-31 (the 
relevant portions of the transcript are attached as Addendum B). 
Issue II: Whether the court erred when it dismissed a juror without first 
questioning the juror when the court believed the juror had fallen asleep during 
the trial. 
 Standard of Review/Preservation: Utah courts generally review challenges 
to a judge’s ruling regarding sleeping jurors for abuse of discretion.  See State v. 
Lesley, 672 P.2d 79, 82 (Utah 1983); State v. Pace, 527 P.2d 658, 659 (Utah 
1974).  Counsel preserved this issue when he objected to dismissing the juror, 
explained that counsel had seen the juror in question taking notes and paying 
attention, and reminded the court that the defense had strategically selected the 
jury.  R:789-92 (the relevant portions of the transcript are attached as Addendum 
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C).  Additionally, the prosecution agreed that it would be appropriate to question 
the juror before dismissing her.  R:789. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND THE FACTS 
 SM was driving home from work around 4pm on June 6, 2016, when he 
saw a maroon car swerving ahead of him on 4800 West.  R:567-69; 668 (time of 
incident was 4:13pm).  When the maroon car pulled into the right turn lane at 
around 70th South, SM passed the car on the left.  R:571.  Instead of turning 
right, the maroon car pulled up alongside SM.  R:573.  The driver of the maroon 
car showed SM that he had a gun.  R:576.  SM called 911 as the car followed him 
on Grizzly Way.  R:577.  The maroon car hit SM’s car, forcing it onto a residential 
lawn.  R:581.  The driver of the maroon car then fired a gun at SM.  R:581.  There 
were eight bullet holes in the car and one in a nearby building.  R:818.  One shot 
grazed SM’s neck, although he was not seriously injured.  R:581; 435.   
 SM did not make an identification of the perpetrator at trial.  SM did testify 
that the driver had tattoos on his arm.  R:571.  There was evidence that Granados 
had tattoos.  R: 987.  A woman who was standing on Grizzly Way during the 
incident did not see the driver or the license plate, but she noticed that the 
maroon car had sustained damage on the front passenger’s side, and that it had a 
triangle decal in the window.  R:589-90.  Another witness made eye contact with 
the driver in the maroon car.  R:602.  At trial, she testified that the driver had a 
round face, dark eyes, dark short hair, and a mustache.  R:604.  This general 
description did not exclude Granados.  State’s Ex. 50c.  She observed the driver 
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get out of his car to pick up the bumper, which had fallen off, and put it inside the 
car.  R:606.  When presented with a photo array the day after the shooting that 
included Granados’s photo, she selected a different photo as resembling the 
offender.  R:608-10; 1009.  None of the State’s witnesses identified Granados as 
the shooter.   
 The day before the shooting, a property crimes detective was looking for a 
red 2002 Chevy Malibu belonging to MA.  R:627.  He was also looking for Joseph 
Granados, who he believed had a previous relationship with MA.  R:627.  The 
detective located Granados in the Malibu at a McDonald’s.  R:629.  He tried to get 
Granados to pull over, but Granados fled.  R:632. 
 The police suspected the Malibu might have been involved in the shooting.  
R:725.  The evening of the shooting, a detective looking for Granados spotted him 
in a Chevy Malibu with front-end damage near 3100 South and Bangerter around 
6:15pm.  R:708.  Granados did not stop and the detective lost sight of him.  
R:719-20.  A second officer followed Granados in a high-speed chase that lasted 
over twelve minutes.  R:741; 748; 751. 
 The chase ended with the officer apprehending Granados after Granados 
briefly attempted to flee on foot.  R:752.  The officer searched Granados and 
found a glass pipe and methamphetamine.  R:765. 
 Crime scene technicians processed the Malibu.  R:831.  It had sustained 
damage, it had a “Baby on Board!” decal on the back windshield, and there was a 
bumper in the backseat.  R:779; State’s Ex. 21, 24, 25.  The technicians tested the 
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bumper for fingerprints.  R:894.  A partial palm print — the only evidence 
discovered on the bumper — excluded Granados.  R:844-46.   
The car floor was dirty.  R:911; State’s Ex. 25, 28, 31.  A crime scene 
technician recovered from the floor a 34-caliber bullet and a 40-caliber bullet.  
R:836.  She also recovered ten 40-caliber shell casings.  R:837; 889. 
 A crime scene technician tested the bullets and shell casings for DNA.  
R:885.  The test involved placing each bullet or casing, one at a time, in a buffer 
solution.  R:884.  The technician poured the buffer solution through a filter 
designed to catch cells.  R:886-87.  She then used the same buffer solution for the 
next bullet or casing, and ran it through the same filter.  R:887-88; 890-91.  The 
technician sent the filter to Sorenson Forensics.  R:892.   
A DNA analyst from Sorenson testified that the filter contained DNA from 
two contributors.  R:956.  Granados’s DNA profile matched the major 
contributor, but the amount of his DNA in the bullet and casing mixture was 
small.  R:971.  The analyst explained that there would be no way to know which 
item of the ten casings and two bullets contained the DNA, only that the mixture 
of all of them contained DNA.  R:968.  She also explained that the test could not 
discern whether the DNA ended up on the bullets or casings from direct contact 
or through transfer from something else with DNA on it.  R:967.  She 
acknowledged a person who was touching a car would leave DNA in it.  R:912-13.  
Sweat contains DNA — and there was testimony Granados was sweating, R:987; 
775 — so a person sweating in a car would leave DNA.  R:899; 912-13. 
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 The analyst testified that she had never before pulled a full DNA profile 
from a spent shell casing.  R:970.  The technician similarly testified that in her 
seventeen years as a crime scene technician she had never before seen a full DNA 
profile pulled from a shell casing.  R:914.  The technician testified that heat 
damages DNA, but studies conflict on whether firing a gun would destroy any 
DNA on the shell casings.  R:915. 
The State charged Granados with multiple counts related to the shooting — 
attempted murder, multiple counts of felony discharge of a firearm, possession of 
a firearm by a restricted person, and criminal mischief for damaging SM’s car.  
R:1-5.  The State also charged Granados with failure to stop at the command of a 
law officer, possession of a controlled substance, and possession of 
paraphernalia.  R:1-5.  The case proceeded to trial.  R:475. 
The parties selected eight jurors and one alternate.  R:540.  Juror 16 
graduated from the University of Utah and retired after careers as a travel agent 
and elementary educator.  R:487.  She followed the news through Time Magazine 
and the Salt Lake Tribune.  R:488.   
The alternate juror was a high school graduate who worked as a project 
engineer for JWright Companies.  R:489.  He read “outdoor magazines like 
American Rifleman” and watched “Fox News.”  R:489-90. 
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On the second day of trial,1 the officer who apprehended Granados testified 
about the car chase and the State played a video from the officer’s body camera 
depicting the chase, State’s Ex. 56.  R:739.  During this portion of the trial, the 
court called for a break.  R:742.  When the jury was excused, the court said, “The 
reason I did that is Juror No. 16 keeps falling asleep.  And yesterday the same 
thing, is the reason I took some breaks.  And I’m a little concerned right in the 
middle of the presentation that usually would take someone’s attention, she’s 
noticeably falling asleep.”  R:743.  Defense counsel said, “I got to say I’m getting 
tired of the videos too,” and that he “hadn’t noticed” the juror sleeping; he was 
initially open to the possibility of changing alternate jurors before realizing which 
juror was the subject of concern.  R:743-44.  The court said that it had the jurors 
take a break to stand up on the first day of trial because Juror 16 was sleeping.  
R:743.  On the first day of trial, the judge had called for a “stand break” during 
cross-examination of an officer who investigated a scene near the shooting.  
R:666.  At that point in the trial, the defense had been establishing a time line for 
the shooting and the subsequent car chase.  R:661-66. 
After the recess, the court stated that it had decided to dismiss Juror 16.  
R:744.  The court had heard from two staff members that Juror 16 was “sleeping 
                                                          
1 The first day of trial included jury selection and testimony from SM, R:564; 
three witnesses from the Grizzly Way neighborhood, R:584, 600, 635; the 
property crimes detective who saw Granados the day before the shooting, R:626; 
and an officer who investigated a scene near the shooting, R:647.  On the second 
day of trial, a detective who followed and lost Granados testified and the officer 
who followed and apprehended Granados was testifying when the court decided 
to dismiss Juror 16.  R:701; 724; 743. 
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for a significant period of time” and decided “she was obviously falling asleep 
here.”  R:744.   
Defense counsel reiterated that he had not noticed the juror sleeping, but 
that in his experience he had “seen jurors nodding off on occasion” in many other 
trials.  R:745.  He also argued that the videos were not a critical part of the case.  
R:745. 
The court responded, “It happened yesterday.  And again, talking to those 
people who were with me up on the stand, they saw her up to about five minutes 
asleep.”  R:745.     
Defense counsel objected to dismissing Juror 16.  R:745.  He argued that he 
had seen her taking notes and paying attention.  R:789.  And the defense had 
“strategically selected her.”  R:791.  Counsel requested that the court question the 
juror before dismissing her.  R:789-92.  The prosecutor agreed that “it would be 
appropriate to ask her” questions about the court’s observation that she was 
sleeping.  R:789; 791-92. 
The court decided to dismiss the juror without questioning her first.  
R:789.  The court stated that he had seen her “look up, close her eyes, and then 
the head kind of nod forward, and it happened repeatedly.”  R:790.  The court 
“agree[d] that she was trying to be a diligent juror, but” the court and the two 
court staff saw the juror appear to be sleeping “multiple times during significant 
parts of the trial.”  R:791.  The court ruled that it did not “matter at this point 
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whether she knows that she missed it or not.  The fact is that I observed her and 
my staff observed her missing significant parts of the trial.”  R:791. 
The jury convicted Granados of all charged counts.  R:304-05.  The parties 
had agreed that the court would decide the possession of a weapon by a restricted 
person separately.  R:1146.  Although there was no gun in evidence, the court 
found Granados guilty of possession of a weapon based on a prior conviction and 
“the jury having found the defendant was knowingly in possession of a firearm.”  
R:1146. 
The court granted a motion to merge the discharge of a firearm counts with 
attempted murder.  R:1145.  The court sentenced Granados to three years to life 
for attempted murder, one to fifteen years for possession of a dangerous weapon, 
zero to five years for criminal mischief, zero to five years for failure to respond to 
a command of an officer, and credit for time served on the remaining 
misdemeanors.  R:1186-87.  The court ran all the felonies consecutively.  R:1187. 
Granados filed a timely notice of appeal.  R:397. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
 This Court should reverse the counts related to the shooting — attempted 
murder, possession of a dangerous weapon, and criminal mischief — for 
insufficient evidence of identity.  None of the witnesses identified Granados.  The 
DNA evidence was more consistent with presence in the car than participation in 
the shooting.  And additional evidence — fingerprints, an eyewitness photo array, 
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and the absence of any connection between Granados and the shooting victim — 
pointed to innocence. 
 Second, this Court should reverse all the counts because the trial court 
dismissed a juror without questioning her.  As the defense explained, the juror 
was strategically selected, had been paying attention, and the court dismissed her 
for sleeping during a portion of the trial that was not critical.  The error was 
prejudicial because there is a reasonable likelihood that a strategically selected 
juror would not have been as inclined to convict.   
ARGUMENT 
I.  The evidence was insufficient to prove that Granados was 
involved in the shooting. 
 
 The evidence of identity was insufficient for the crimes related to the 
shooting — attempted murder, criminal mischief, and possession of a dangerous 
weapon by a restricted person.  This Court will reverse a conviction for 
insufficient evidence when, viewing “the evidence and all inferences which may 
reasonably be drawn from it in the light most favorable to the verdict . . . the 
evidence is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable 
minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed 
the crime.”  State v. Shumway, 2002 UT 124, ¶ 15.  “[A] guilty verdict is not 
legally valid if it is based solely on inferences that give rise to only remote or 
speculative possibilities of guilt.”  Id. ¶ 18 (alterations omitted) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  The Court “cannot take a speculative leap across a 
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remaining [evidentiary] gap in order to sustain a verdict.”  Id.; see also State v. 
Cristobal, 2010 UT App 228, ¶ 7 (stating that a jury verdict must be based on 
reasonable inferences and not just “speculation and conjecture”).  “Every element 
of the crime charged must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.”  State v. 
Harman, 767 P.2d 567, 568 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).  “If the evidence does not 
support those elements, the verdict must fail.”  Id. 
 A disputed element of all the crimes related to the shooting was identity.  
R:1116; 1119 (defense arguing in closing that counts related to shooting “require 
identification, and we don’t have it”).  “It is well-settled that an essential element 
that the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt is the identification 
of a defendant as the person who perpetrated the crime charged.”  State v. 
Cowlishaw, 2017 UT App 181, ¶ 13 (internal quotation marks omitted).   
Under Utah law, the identification of a driver can be proved by 
circumstantial rather than direct evidence.  See id.  In State v. Milligan, the 
defendant “contend[ed] that the evidence was insufficient” to prove he was 
driving without a license because the testifying officer “did not actually see 
defendant operating his van.”  727 P.2d 213, 215 (Utah 1986).  However, the 
defendant told a police officer that he had been driving the vehicle, so the 
evidence was sufficient.  Id.  
The evidence of identity was likewise sufficient where the defendant was in 
the vehicle “immediately” after the crime and a “search of the area revealed no 
other persons involved.”  State v. Lawson, 688 P.2d 479, 483 (Utah 1984); see 
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also State v. Harris, 2015 UT App 282, ¶ 11 (stating that the evidence was 
sufficient to show that the defendant committed various crimes in the course of 
burglarizing a store where he was the “only person observed in the vicinity of the 
store.”)   
Cases from outside jurisdictions provide examples where evidence of a 
person’s connection to a car was insufficient to prove the person was driving the 
car at the time of the crime.  For example, in State v. Frieday, a Court of Appeals 
of Washington case, the defendant contended that “the State failed to prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt that he was the driver of the car underlying the 
changes on the date in question.”  184 Wash. App. 1037 at *1 (Wash. Ct. App. 
2014).  An officer pulled over a white male with dark brown hair, but the officer 
never saw the man’s face because the car drove away.  Id.  The officer located the 
car, but not the driver, at the defendant’s home address and discovered that the 
defendant owned the car.  Id.  The defendant met the officer’s general 
description.  Id. at *3.  The appellate court held that the “vague, general 
description” of the driver was “insufficient to establish beyond a reasonable 
doubt identity.”  Id. at *3.      
In Patterson v. State, a driver in a maroon Honda Accord harassed another 
driver, who observed that he was “a male with a dark complexion” and wrote 
down the license plate number.  650 S.E.2d 770, 772 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007).  The 
license plate number was registered to the defendant’s sister.  Id.  “This evidence 
13 
 
was insufficient for a rational trier of fact to find that [the defendant] was the 
driver beyond a reasonable doubt.”  Id. at 774. 
In State v. Coffman, the State presented evidence that the defendant’s 
girlfriend’s car had been used in a chase and the driver had fled on foot.  767 
S.E.2d 704, at *1 (N.C. Ct. App. 2014).  The defendant’s wallet, including an 
identification, was in the front seat of the vehicle.  Id.  The Court of Appeals of 
North Carolina held that even if the evidence showed “defendant’s presence in 
the vehicle at some point in the past, it was insufficient to show that defendant 
was operating the vehicle during the specific time when the high-speed chase 
took place.”  Id. at *3. 
In Granados’s case, the marshaled evidence shows that Granados had a 
previous relationship with the car’s owner, R:627, that he met the general 
description of the shooter, R:571, and that he was driving the car the day before 
the shooting and hours after the shooting — at both times, the police attempted 
to stop him and he fled.  R:752.  Additionally, Granados’s DNA was on one or 
more of the items recovered in the car he was driving during the chase — a 34-
caliber bullet, a 40-caliber bullet, and ten 40-caliber shell casings.  R:837; 889; 
836. 
This case is therefore more like the extra-jurisdictional cases where 
connection to the car and matching a general description were insufficient to 
establish identity beyond a reasonable doubt at the time of the crime.  See 
Patterson, 650 S.E.2d at 772; Coffman, 767 S.E.2d at *3; Frieday, 184 Wash. 
14 
 
App. 1037 at *1-3.  Granados’s case is unlike Milligan, where the defendant made 
admissions.  727 P.2d at 215.  And it is distinguishable from Lawson, where the 
defendant was connected to the vehicle in the immediate aftermath of the crime.  
688 P.2d at 483. 
The State’s evidence, including the DNA evidence and the flight from the 
police, were insufficient to sustain a conviction.  “When the evidence supports 
more than one possible conclusion, none more likely than the other, the choice of 
one possibility over another can be no more than speculation; while a reasonable 
inference arises when the facts can reasonably be interpreted to support a 
conclusion that one possibility is more probable than another.”  Cristobal, 2010 
UT App 228, ¶ 16.  “[F]light from the scene of the crime does not, in itself, prove 
his involvement but is a circumstance from which his involvement may be 
inferred.”  Id. ¶ 15.  In Granados’s case, flight was particularly weak evidence of 
guilt because Granados had also fled from the police the day before the shooting.  
R:632.  Under the facts and circumstances of Granados’s case, the jury could not 
infer that Granados was guilty of the shooting because he fled from the police 
again over two hours after the shooting. 
Likewise, the DNA evidence was more consistent with mere presence in the 
car than it was with participation in the shooting.  The State’s DNA analyst tested 
multiple items from inside the car with the same filter, making it impossible to 
tell which item contained Granados’s DNA.  R:968.  Some scientific studies 
suggest that the items directly related to the shooting, the spent casings, would 
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have been stripped of any DNA when they were fired.  R:915.  Consistent with 
those studies, the State’s DNA analyst and DNA technician had never before 
recovered DNA from a spent casing.  R:970; 914.  Of the two remaining items, 
one was an unfired bullet of a different caliber from the gun used in the shooting.  
R: 836.  It would be speculation to suggest that the DNA came from the shell 
casings as opposed to the unfired bullet of a different caliber, which was not 
involved in the shooting.  See Cristobal, 2010 UT App 228, ¶ 16. 
Furthermore, the DNA test could not discern whether the DNA ended up 
on the bullets or casings from direct contact or through transfer from something 
else with DNA on it.  R:967.  The evidence was uncontested that Granados was 
driving the car during a high-speed chase.  R:987.  The chase would have shifted 
items in the messy car.  R:786.  Additionally, Granados would have been 
breathing, sweating, and touching things in the car, all of which leave DNA.  
R:899-900; 912-13.  It is therefore speculation based on an unlikely scenario that 
Granados’s DNA was on the spent shell casing from loading and firing the gun, an 
activity that degrades DNA.  R:915.  It is much more likely that his DNA 
transferred to items that were already in the car.  “[A] guilty verdict is not legally 
valid if it is based solely on inferences that give rise to only remote or speculative 
possibilities of guilt.”  Shumway, 2002 UT 124, ¶ 18 (alterations omitted) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).   
Additionally, the stronger circumstantial evidence pointed to innocence.  
An eyewitness at the time of the shooting observed the driver get out of his car to 
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pick up the bumper, which had fallen off, and put it inside the car.  R:606.  The 
car Granados was driving had a bumper in the backseat.  R:779; State’s Ex. 21, 
24, 25.  The State found a partial palm print on the bumper, but it was not 
Granados’s.  R:894; 844-46.  This evidence suggested that someone else was 
driving the car, and picking up the bumper, at the time of the shooting. 
Furthermore, an eyewitness who made eye contact with the shooter looked 
at a photo array the day after the shooting.  R:602; 604.  The photo array 
included Granados’s photo, but the eyewitness selected only a different photo as 
resembling the offender.  R:608-10; 1009.   
Another piece of circumstantial evidence pointing to innocence was that 
Granados was completely unconnected to the shooting victim and had no reason 
to commit the crime.  R:1105.  The State could only remind the jury that it did not 
have to show a motive.  R:1105.  The prosecutor speculated that Granados could 
have mistaken the victim for someone else.  R:1105.  But there was no evidence 
that Granados was motivated to kill a third party.   
In summary, the marshaled evidence raises only a speculative possibility of 
guilt.  The reasonable inferences from the evidence point to innocence.  This 
Court should therefore reverse and vacate the convictions related to the shooting. 
II.  The court erred when it dismissed a juror suspected of sleeping 
without first questioning her. 
 
The court erred when it replaced a juror whom the defense had 
strategically selected.  R:791.  Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 17(g) states, “If a 
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juror becomes ill, disabled or disqualified during trial and an alternate juror has 
been selected, the case shall proceed using the alternate juror.”  The court erred 
in Granados’s case because it could not determine, without first questioning the 
juror, that the juror was sleeping to the point of disqualification from service. 
Utah cases demonstrate that sleeping for brief periods does not disqualify a 
juror.  In State v. Mellor, “[t]he trial court found that the juror to all outward 
appearances at several different times had gone to sleep, but only for two or three 
minutes, just a short time.”  272 P. 635, 639 (Utah 1928).  The juror admitted he 
“‘dozed off’ several times.”  Id.  But he claimed he was ‘not unconscious,’ and . . . 
‘heard and understood all that transpired in the courtroom during the trial.’”  Id.  
The Utah Supreme Court held that although “the juror, at brief intervals, did doze 
off, or fell asleep, yet on the record [the appellate court] cannot say that the juror 
did not hear and fully comprehend the substance of the testimony of the witness.”  
Id. 
In State v. Pace, “[t]wo onlookers said two of the jurors consciously went to 
sleep” and the judge observed that one “did doze for a second, twice.”  527 P.2d 
658, 659 (Utah 1974).  The Utah Supreme Court upheld the trial judge’s denial of 
a mistrial, noting that there was “nothing . . . reflecting that the juror could have 
been ensconced, so as to have stupefied the veniremen.”  Id.; see also United 
States v. Diaz, 176 F.3d 52, 78 (2d Cir. 1999) (finding no harm where juror 
“perhaps had slept for a very brief moment, [but] was generally alert and 
attentive to the evidence”); Samad v. United States, 812 A.2d 226, 230 (D.C. 
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2002) (“To be sure, brief lapses in attention that are not prejudicial may be 
excused.”). 
In Granados’s case, the court’s observation that the the juror dozed for 
periods of up to five minutes was not necessarily disqualifying.  R:745.  The court 
stated, “It happened yesterday.  And again, talking to those people who were with 
me up on the stand, they saw her up to about five minutes asleep.”  R:745.  But 
the court also said that, when it happened the previous day, the judge had called 
for standing breaks.  R:743; 666.  Defense counsel noted, “I do know that in many 
of the trials that I’ve done, I’ve seen jurors nodding off on occasion.”  R:745.  The 
court was incorrect that briefly dozing off disqualified the juror.   
Furthermore, the Pace court noted that it was significant when in the case 
the juror was observed sleeping.  Pace,527 P.2d at 659 n.2.  As defense counsel in 
Granados’s case pointed out, the twelve-minute video of the police chase was not 
a critical part of the State’s case.  R:745; 741; 748; 751; 743 (Defense counsel: “I 
got to say I’m getting tired of the videos, too, but . . .”).  The first day of trial, the 
court had called for a standing break while the defense was cross-examining an 
officer to establish a time line for the shooting and the car chase.  R:661-66.  This 
was evidence that was uncontested and explored at other points in the trial.  
R:719 (detective saying the vehicle was spotted at 6:15pm); 567 (SM testifying the 
shooting happened around 4pm). 
The court erred when it declined to question the juror.  The defense 
requested that the court question the juror, and the prosecutor agreed that 
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questioning would be appropriate.  R:789.  This appears to be standard in Utah: 
in Mellor, “the juror himself testified that because of some work he had done 
during the previous night and because the room was close he ‘dozed off’” but 
“‘heard and understood all that transpired in the courtroom during the trial.’”  
Mellor, 272 P. at 639.  In State v. Anderson, the allegedly sleeping juror “filed an 
affidavit” before the court made a finding of fact.  251 P. 362, 364 (Utah 1926).   
Other jurisdictions have more explicitly clarified the appropriate follow-up 
procedure for courts who suspect that a juror fell asleep.  “The trial court should 
begin, for example, with a hearing to determine whether the juror had been 
asleep and, if so, whether the juror had missed essential portions of the trial.”  
Golsun v. United States, 592 A.2d 1054, 1057 (D.C. 1991) (alterations omitted) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  When a judge receives reliable information 
about a juror’s inattention, “the judge must take further steps to determine 
appropriate intervention.  Typically the next step is to conduct a voir dire of the 
potentially inattentive juror, in an attempt to investigate whether the juror 
remains capable of fulfilling his or her obligation to render a verdict based on all 
of the evidence.”  Commonwealth v. McGhee, 25 N.E.3d 251, 256 (Mass. 2015) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
In Granados’s case, the court’s observations did not disqualify the juror 
automatically.  Defense counsel “hadn’t noticed” the juror sleeping.  R:743.  
Moreover, defense counsel did not want to dismiss the juror because he saw “her 
taking notes” and “trying to pay attention.”  R:789.  A Massachusetts trial “judge 
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pointed out that ‘some people, when they concentrate, they close their eyes.’”  Id. 
at 255; accord Pelham v. Page, 6 Ark. 535, 538 (Ark. 1846) (“He may have 
appeared to have been asleep, when in truth he was not so.”); Cont’l Cas. Co. v. 
Semple, 112 S.W. 1122, 1123 (Ky. 1908) (“the juror himself swore that he was not 
asleep at any time during the trial, that he had a habit of closing his eyes when 
listening to others, and that he heard all that was said by both witnesses and 
lawyers”); McClary v. State, 75 Ind. 260, 265 (1881) (“the affidavit filed in 
support of this cause did not aver that the juror actually fell asleep, but only that 
he had his eyes closed, and appeared to be asleep”); Dick v. Dick, 58 P.2d 1125, 
1126 (Kan. 1936) (“there was testimony that he was not asleep, but had simply 
relaxed and partly closed his eyes while listening to the testimony”). 
Although the trial judge and two court staff believed they saw the juror fall 
asleep, R:791, it was error to dismiss the juror over defense counsel’s objection, 
R:745; 791, without questioning her first.   
The court’s error was prejudicial.  This Court will reverse where, “without 
the error there was a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result for the 
defendant.”  State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 919 (Utah 1987) (emphasis omitted) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).   
As an initial matter, there is a reasonable likelihood that questioning the 
juror would have alleviated the court’s concerns that she had missed significant 
portions of the trial.  As argued above, the juror was not observed sleeping during 
critical portions of the trial, R:743, a juror can close her eyes and still pay 
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attention, McGhee, 25 N.E.3d at 255, and even briefly nodding off is not 
disqualifying.  Mellor, 272 P. at 639. 
Defense counsel explained that the defense had strategically selected the 
juror.  R:789-92.  Voir dire is “a very important part of trial procedure.” Wayne R. 
LaFave et al., 6 Criminal Procedure, § 22.3(a), at 71 (3rd ed. 2007).  It is the 
process “by which both the defense and the prosecution try to eliminate . . .  
prospective jurors who appear sympathetic to the opposition or at least 
unsympathetic to their side.”  Id.  “‘Many attorneys believe that trials are 
frequently won or lost during this process.’”  Id.   “The process by which the 
principal jurors and alternate jurors are chosen is crucial to the preservation of 
the right to an impartial jury. . . . The primary function of a peremptory challenge 
is to allow parties to strike prospective jurors whom they have good reason to 
believe might be biased but who are not so clearly and obviously partial that they 
could otherwise be excluded from the panel.”  Bruckshaw v. Frankford Hosp. of 
City of Philadelphia, 58 A.3d 102, 112 (Pa. 2012).  Additionally, “[a]s a strategic 
matter, counsel may decide, as the number of available peremptory challenges 
decreases, to accept jurors with unappealing characteristics or make 
compromises about who is an acceptable juror.”  Id.  “[T]he parties have little 
reason to save their peremptory challenges for the last alternate chosen because 




For example, in this case Juror 16 was college educated.  R:487.  She had 
insight and experience dealing with people as a travel agent and had a career in 
education.  R:487.  She followed the news through Time Magazine and the Salt 
Lake Tribune.  R:488.   
The alternate juror did not have a college education.  R:489.  He read 
“outdoor magazines like American Rifleman” and “Fox News.”  R:489-90.  Fox 
News is known for coverage advocating tough-on-crime policies.  E.g., Nick 
Summers, Fox News Coverage of the Trayvon Martin Case Criticized (March 21, 
2012), The Daily Beast,  https://www.thedailybeast.com/fox-news-coverage-of-
the-trayvon-martin-case-criticized?ref=scroll (“Fox has been known for its 
aggressive coverage of stories relating to . . . crime.”); see also Maurice 
Chammah, American Sheriff (May 5, 2016), The Atlantic, 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/05/american-
sheriff/481131/ (“David Clarke, the . . . pro-mass-incarceration, Fox News 
Favorite . . .”). 
The court’s error here is similar to an error that requires counsel to use a 
peremptory challenge on a juror that should have been excused for cause.  In 
both instances, the defense is unfairly disadvantaged in its selection of the jury.  
In the case of a wasted peremptory challenge, the Utah Supreme Court overruled 
precedent holding that it is presumptively prejudicial because a “party should not 
be compelled to waste” a peremptory challenge and the “juror which remained 
because the plaintiffs had no challenge to remove him may have been a hawk 
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amid seven doves and imposed his will upon them.”  Crawford v. Manning, 542 
P.2d 1091, 1093 (Utah 1975), overruled by State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 398 
(Utah 1994) (“To prevail on a claim of error based on the failure to remove a juror 
for cause, a defendant must demonstrate prejudice, viz., show that a member of 
the jury was partial or incompetent.”).    
However, where counsel has already selected the jury and the defense 
objects that replacing a juror with the alternate juror would frustrate the 
defense’s strategic selection, a defendant can show a reasonable likelihood of a 
more favorable outcome without showing that a member of the jury panel should 
have been excluded for cause.   
First, counsel and the defendant have had an opportunity to view the jurors 
during the presentation of evidence.  In Grandos’s case, the defense had observed 
Juror 16 taking notes and wanted her to remain on the jury.  R:789.  The 
circumstances are different from a case where defense counsel is merely selecting 
which jurors to strike before the presentation of evidence. 
Second, it would open the door to misconduct to adopt a per se rule that, 
absent proof of a juror’s actual bias or incompetence, it is never prejudicial to 
replace a juror with an alternate.  The appellate courts cannot “ensure fair trial 
and protect the integrity of the jury” if they “impose the impossible burden of 
requiring a showing of prejudice” where the district court improperly replaced a 
competent juror with an alternate.  Bruckshaw, 58 A.3d at 153. For example — 
although not a concern in Granados’s case — such a rule would insulate the 
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replacement of jurors with alternates even if the replacement were racially 
motivated.  Cf. United States v. Nelson, 102 F.3d 1344, 1350 (4th Cir. 1996) 
(“Nelson argues that the court’s standard for replacing juries should be 
heightened in the circumstances of this case because two black jurors were being 
replaced with two white jurors.”). 
Instead of requiring a showing of actual bias or incompetence, this Court 
should reverse because, under the generally applicable standard for reversal, 
there is a reasonable likelihood that, absent the error, the outcome would have 
been more favorable to Granados.  Knight, 734 P.2d at 919.  And it should grant 
that, in most circumstances, a strategically selected jury will yield a more 
favorable result for a defendant than one that is selected over the defense’s 
objection after the presentation of evidence has begun.   
Furthermore, the evidence related to the shooting was weak.  Even if the 
evidence was minimally sufficient, it was not so convincing that any reasonable 
juror would convict.  See supra, Issue I.  No witness identified Granados as the 
shooter, R:608-10; 1009 (the only witness to make an identification did not select 
Granados’s photo from a photo array), he had no motivation to shoot the victim, 
R:1105, and his fingerprints were excluded in a test of the bumper a witness saw 
the shooter touch.  R:844-46.   
In conclusion, the court erred when it dismissed the juror without 
questioning her.  The error was prejudicial because there is a reasonable 
likelihood that, absent the court's error, the result would have been more 
favorable to Granados. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons argued in Issue I, Granados respectfully requests that this 
Court reverse and vacate for insufficient evidence his convictions of attempted 
murder, criminal mischief, and possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted 
person. 
For the reasons argued in Issue II, Granados respectfully requests that this 
Court reverse all his convictions and remand for a new trial. 
. ,-+h 
SUBMITTED th1~ ~ . day of October 2018. 
OCG ~ ~ 
NATHALI ~ - SKIBINE 
Attorney for Defendant/ Appellant 
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                                    3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE  
                                   SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH  
        ______________________________________________________________________________________
 
        STATE OF UTAH,                            :  MINUTES                                   
                    Plaintiff,                    :  SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT            
                                                  :  
        vs.                                       :  Case No: 161906242 FS                     
        JOSEPH CRESCENCIO GRANADOS,               :  Judge:   PAUL B PARKER                    
                    Defendant.                    :  Date:    December 22, 2017                
        Custody: Salt Lake County Jail                                                         
                                                                                               
        ______________________________________________________________________________________
        PRESENT                                                                                
        Clerk:    shantec                                                                      
        Prosecutor: BRADFORD D COOLEY                                                          
                    ADAM B BLANCH                                                              
        Defendant Present                                                                      
        The defendant is in the custody of the Salt Lake County Jail                           
        Defendant's Attorney(s): DAVID P S MACK                                                
                                 NICK FALCONE                                                  
                                                                                               
        DEFENDANT INFORMATION                        
        Date of birth: September 23, 1982                                                      
        Sheriff Office#: 380860                                                                
        Audio                                                                                  
        Tape Number:     S34   Tape Count: 9.02-9.48                                           
                                                                                               
 
        CHARGES                                                                                
        1. ATTEMPTED MURDER - 1st Degree Felony
             Plea: Not Guilty  - Disposition: 10/20/2017 Guilty                                
        2. FELONY DISCHARGE OF A FIREARM - 2nd Degree Felony
             Plea: Guilty  - Disposition: 12/22/2017 No Cause of Action                        
        3. FELONY DISCHARGE OF A FIREARM - 3rd Degree Felony
             Plea: Guilty  - Disposition: 12/22/2017 No Cause of Action                        
        4. FELONY DISCHARGE OF A FIREARM - 3rd Degree Felony
             Plea: Guilty  - Disposition: 12/22/2017 No Cause of Action                        
        5. FELONY DISCHARGE OF A FIREARM - 3rd Degree Felony
             Plea: Guilty  - Disposition: 12/22/2017 No Cause of Action                        
        6. FELONY DISCHARGE OF A FIREARM - 3rd Degree Felony
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        Case No: 161906242 Date:    Dec 22, 2017
        ______________________________________________________________________________________
 
             Plea: Guilty  - Disposition: 12/22/2017 No Cause of Action                        
        7. FELONY DISCHARGE OF A FIREARM - 3rd Degree Felony
             Plea: Guilty  - Disposition: 12/22/2017 No Cause of Action                        
        8. FELONY DISCHARGE OF A FIREARM - 3rd Degree Felony
             Plea: Guilty  - Disposition: 12/22/2017 No Cause of Action                        
        9. FELONY DISCHARGE OF A FIREARM - 3rd Degree Felony
             Plea: Guilty  - Disposition: 12/22/2017 No Cause of Action                        
        10. FELONY DISCHARGE OF A FIREARM - 3rd Degree Felony
             Plea: Guilty  - Disposition: 12/22/2017 No Cause of Action                        
        11. FELONY DISCHARGE OF A FIREARM - 3rd Degree Felony
             Plea: Guilty  - Disposition: 12/22/2017 No Cause of Action                        
        12. FAIL TO STOP OR RESPOND AT COMMAND OF POLICE - 3rd Degree Felony
             Plea: Not Guilty  - Disposition: 10/20/2017 Guilty                                
        13. CRIMINAL MISCHIEF:INTENTIONAL DAMAGE,DEFACE,DESTROY PROPERTY - 3rd Degree Felony
             Plea: Not Guilty  - Disposition: 10/20/2017 Guilty                                
        14. POSSESSION OR USE OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE - Class A Misdemeanor
             Plea: Not Guilty  - Disposition: 10/20/2017 Guilty                                
        15. USE OR POSSESSION OF DRUG PARAPHERNALIA - Class B Misdemeanor
             Plea: Not Guilty  - Disposition: 10/20/2017 Guilty                                
        16. POSSESSION OF A DNGR WEAP BY RESTRICTED - 2nd Degree Felony
             Plea: Not Guilty  - Disposition: 10/20/2017 Guilty                                
 
        SENTENCE PRISON                                                                        
        Based on the defendant's conviction of ATTEMPTED MURDER a 1st Degree Felony, the 
        defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not less than three years and which 
        may be life in the Utah State Prison.                                                  
        
        Based on the defendant's conviction of FAIL TO STOP OR RESPOND AT COMMAND OF POLICE a 
        3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not to exceed
        five years in the Utah State Prison.                                                   
        
        Based on the defendant's conviction of CRIMINAL MISCHIEF:INTENTIONAL 
        DAMAGE,DEFACE,DESTROY PROPERTY a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an 
        indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in the Utah State Prison.               
        
        Based on the defendant's conviction of POSSESSION OF A DNGR WEAP BY RESTRICTED a 2nd 
        Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not less than one
        year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah State Prison.                             
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        To the SALT LAKE County Sheriff:  The defendant is remanded to your custody for 
        transportation to the Utah State Prison where the defendant will be confined.          
 
        
        SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE                                            
        To run consecutive.  Counts 14 and 15 are consecutive with credit for time served and 
        closed.                                                                                
 
        ALSO KNOWN AS (AKA) NOTE                                                               
        JOSEPH PSYCHO                                                                          
        CYKO                                                                                   
        GF PSYCHO                                                                              
        J PSYCHO                                                                               
        JOSEPH GRANADOS                                                                        
 
                                                                                               
 
        SENTENCE JAIL                                                                          
                                                                                               
                                                                                               
                                                                                               
                                                                                               
                                                                                               
                                                                                               
                                                                                               
                                                                                               
                                                                                               
                                                                                               
                                                                                               
                                                                                               
                                                                                               
        Based on the defendant's conviction of POSSESSION OR USE OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE a 
        Class A Misdemeanor, the defendant is sentenced to a term of 365 day(s)                
        Based on the defendant's conviction of USE OR POSSESSION OF DRUG PARAPHERNALIA a Class 
        B Misdemeanor, the defendant is sentenced to a term of 180 day(s)                      
                                                                                               
        Credit is granted for 545 day(s) previously served.                                    
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         Restitution      Amount: $3526.95 Plus Interest
        Pay in behalf of: OFFICE FOR VICTIM OF CRIME                                           
        
         Restitution      Amount: $1200.00
        Pay in behalf of: KIMBERLY N                                                           
        
         Restitution      Amount: $375.00
        Pay in behalf of: JOSE M                                                               
        
        Defendant has a right to file a notice of appeal within 30 days of sentencing.         
 
        Motion to merge charges 2-11 into count 1 is granted.                                  
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                           CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION                                         
 
        I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the following people for 
        case 161906242 by the method and on the date specified.                                
                                                   
        EMAIL:  ADC ADC-court1@slco.org                                                        
        EMAIL:  ADC ADC-Transportation@slco.org                                                
        EMAIL:  PRISON udc-records@utah.gov                                                    
                                                   
              12/28/2017                  /s/ SHANTE COLLINS                                   
        Date: ____________________         ______________________________                      
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MS. VALDEZ:  I think so.  
MR. FALCONE:  And, Judge, I have something at 10 for
competency on another case.  
MR. COOLEY:  I think Mr. Falcone can find some
coverage for that. 
THE COURT:  You guys are stuck here at 9:00.  
MR. COOLEY:  We'll be here at 9:00.  
THE COURT:  We'll start promptly at 9:00.  If you
would be here at quarter to, and we'll be ready and we'll
proceed.
THE BAILIFF:  All rise for the jury.
(Jury exits the courtroom.)
THE COURT:  Have a seat.  Jury has now been excused,
the door is not closed.  I've got to go get the jury
instructions anyway.  
All right.  Now the door is closed.  Motions?
MR. FALCONE:  Judge, we'd like to start off by asking
the Court to direct a verdict in this case.  Would you like to
hear argument on that.
THE COURT:  Yes.
MR. FALCONE:  All right.  So, Your Honor, there are
several charges, and we need to address some of these and what
the State has prevent -- presented as part -- part of their
evidence in this case.  So we have the attempted homicide Count
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counts, and we're going down to 13, a felony discharge of a 
firearm.  
So I'd like to address those as being the most
crucial for the Court's determination on how this case goes
forward.  There are two parts to this case.  Part 1 is a
shooting that happens in West -- in West Jordan.  Okay?  And
then four hours later, right around there, there is a chase in
--
THE COURT:  Four hours later?
MR. FALCONE:  Well, the first report of the shooting
comes in around 4:00.  And so West Valley starts communicating
with this detective or he hears the calls coming in about seven
o'clock, according to his testimony.  So there is that several
hour period that the shooting happens and then there's the
chase.
So in the meantime, this vehicle is somewhere, that
we don't know where it is.  And what is the evidence we have at
the scene of the shooting.  The evidence we have at the scene
of the shooting is that there were several witnesses there.
Some of them saw the shooting happening.  One of the witnesses
says that she actually has a sight and she's looking at the
person that is involved in the shooting, that's Ms. Henry.
Ms. Henry says that.  She also sees this individual get out of
the car and actually take the bumper and put it in the back
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But when she testifies, she says she has a perfect
memory, and then she presented with this photo lineup where she
picks the wrong person.  That's all the evidence we have from
her in regards to identification.
Then we have the alleged victim in the matter, who
also reports that he has no clear identification of the person
that shot at him at his vehicle.  And if we look at the
majority of the shots fired, they're fired in the rear portion
of the car.  So as a part of the homicide, even the attempted
homicide statute, there has to be intent to -- to kill, and
that's an imperfect attempt kill, because it's an attempted
homicide.  But that intent has to be there, it has to be
present.
So we can't really get there when we have, first of
all, no identification.  Now remember, there were several other
people that see this thing happen.  There are two witnesses
that are standing with their teenage children.  The police get
one of these witnesses via 911 call.  But she's never
interviewed by the police at the time this all went down.  So
they're relying on the call, and then they talk to her or
communicate with her at some other time, but they never
communicate with her daughter who's old enough to definitely
see what's going on, and actually have some input on the ID.
Then we have another person standing on her doorstep
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possibly, or standing right behind her, also not and
interviewed by the police and never given a statement.  All of
these witnesses cannot confirm Mr. Granados as being the person
that shot at the car.  Intent to kill, all the shots are
happening in back of the car.  
As a matter of fact, it appears that the one shot
that actually hit the alleged victim in the side, it's a --
it's a -- it looks like it's a stray, but never intended to
actually hit him, otherwise you'd be firing directly at him.
And once again, we have no idea who's doing that.  
The State is making a lot of assumption in that
several-hour period as to whether Mr. Granados is the shooter
or not, just because he's in the vehicle at the time, that they
chase him through West Valley.  Additionally, they chased him
the night before.  He tried to get away and then they chased
him before that.  We have evidence.  So he runs from the
police.  That doesn't make him a shooter in the West Valley
City -- I mean, the West Jordan incident.  There has to be more
to connect him.  The nexus has to be more clear, and it is not
clear.
The Court actually ruled yesterday or gave
instruction to the jury that identification has not been made
in relationship to the shooting.  And I believe that would
still be the Court's position now.  And if that is the case,
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factual question of whether there's identification or not.
And there has not been identification of the person
that was shooting out of his vehicle, and there's different
variations of what everybody sees of how that shooting is
happening, and Mr. Granados' gun's never found, obtained, so we
have none of that evidence.
Evidence is mishandled continuously.  Different
people are in and out of the car, the car's transported, people
don't know where the car is or in relationship to the
investigation.
Okay.  Now what do we have ID on?  We do have ID 14
through 20, and thus -- that's in regard to the chase and in
regard to the detention and arrest of Mr. Granados after he is
chased.  So all these officers that testified about that, did
identify Mr. Granados, because they found him, they got him.
We saw the video.  Okay.  That's the chase.
So right now the defense, I think we're in good
standing to make this motion, is asking the court to dismiss 1
through 13 of the information based on no identification, the
faulty evidence that was found, and absence of any other
evidence that links Mr. Granados to the shooting.  So I'll
submit with that.
THE COURT:  The motion will be denied.  There has
been quite substantial evidence to -- for which the jury could
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start with the identification issues.  Of course there is the
statement by the victim in this case that he saw a single
Hispanic male with tattoos on his arm in the car and that was
the person that fired the shots at him.  There was the witness
that was -- what was her name?  Excuse me.  Who was standing
with her -- Ms. Wood who heard four shots, and then a little
bit of a pause and heard more, saw a car pass.  The car was a
maroon car, and I guess I need to back up.  
The victim identified it as a maroon kind of a
mid-size car with -- that hit him in the rear.  The inferences
that would cause that damage to his car, Ms. Wood saw damage to
the front of the car, saw the front passenger side kind of
caved in and identified a white triangle in the back of the
car, which when it was found by the police later in the chase,
did, in fact, have that little triangle for the child on board.  
There was an officer that saw a headlight set up that
the other witness identified as falling off the car, that was
Ms. Henry.  The car when it was found was missing the
headlight.  She also identified the individual that stopped and
picked up the bumper and then put it in the back of the car.
That bumper was found in the car.  Described the defendant as
having a round face, dark eyes, short hair, dark hair, and
although she did not pick him out, was not sure, and frankly,
as I reviewed the lineup, is fairly remarkable for all the
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consistent with the defendant in this case.
The defendant was seen from the car.  There was
testimony that this was, I believe his wife's or his
girlfriend's car that he had evaded the police the day before
in the car, that he was a person who engaged within two hours,
and I heard it was just shortly after 6:00 when they started
that, led them in quite an extraordinary chase.  The inference
from that is that he is the one that fired the shots.  I think
there's more than enough to identify him.  
As far as my comments they hadn't been able to
identify him, that perhaps was too strong.  I was reacting to a
opinion and a statement by the officer calling him 
various -- or giving his opinions about him.  I certainly -- if
that's something that counsel will refer to in the -- in their
closing arguments, I will have to instruct the jury further
that they certainly may infere from -- any of the evidence, the
identification for which they seek.  I was simply objecting to
a characterization given that evidence at that particular time.
I'd also note, as far as an attempt, that the -- the
defendant is accused and the evidence was clear that the person
who the jury may infere is the defendant, followed closely the
victim's car, rammed the car in a matter that drove -- forced
him off the road into another car and then up on across the
curb on the sidewalk.  The bullets went roughly from the
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were sufficiently, if his direction and -- and number that the
jury could very well find that he intended to kill the victim
when he shot at him, so the motion's denied.  
MR. MACK:  Okay.  
THE COURT:  Do you have other motions?
MR. FALCONE:  Do you have any other motions, Dave?  
Okay.  We have no other motions.
THE COURT:  All right.  Let's talk about jury
instruction then.
And I fixed the one as I indicated, adding the word
"intent" on intentionally discharged the firearm for all of the
discharge of a firearm charges.  
MR. COOLEY:  Your Honor, defense counsel and I
discussed that.  My position would be that with respect to the
prong of the discharge statute, that I included in the proposed
elements instructions, it becomes general intent.  If you
discharge a firearm in the direction of any person knowing or
having reason to believe that any person may be in danger, you
don't need to intentionally discharge the firearm.  At that
point I -- I think the statute, by leaving it out where it
includes it in the other prongs, I believe that indicates that
it's a general intent with respect to the mechanical side of
things.  
With respect to the act itself, I -- it doesn't say
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(Video playing)  
Q. What road are you traveling on there?
A. We're northbound on Redwood Road.  I believe we're
approaching 500 South.  Nope, that's on the end.
(Following is audio playing) 
Echo 22, do we have [inaudible] 
Q.  (BY MR. COOLEY)  During this period, what was the --
what was your speed, do you recall?
A. Uh, my speed ranged from 45 to 60 miles -- 65 miles
an hour is what I'm approximating.
Q. What -- what road are you crossing right now?
A. That is I-80, the I-80 overpass that we're passing
and turning left westbound onto the on-ramp to 215 and I-80
here.
Q. The narration that you are hearing in the background,
was that another officer that's involved in this?
A. It is.  On the radio?
Q. Yeah.
A. Yes, that's the No. 2 vehicle which is the vehicle
behind me that's calling out the pursuit.  That's Sergeant
Gray.
Q. Okay.
THE COURT:  Let's pause for a moment, if you can.
Let's take about a 15-minute break.  It looks like everyone is
getting a little tired.  Let's give you your morning break.
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We'll take 15 minutes.
THE BAILIFF:  All rise for the jury.
THE COURT:  Have a seat, please.
You can just put that microphone -- you don't have to
resume the stand.
The reason I did that is Juror No. 16 keeps falling
asleep.  And yesterday the same thing, is the reason I took
some breaks.  And I'm a little concerned right in the middle of
the presentation that usually would take someone's attention,
she's noticeably falling asleep.
MR. MACK:  I got to say I'm getting tired of the
videos too, but...  Perhaps we can just agree that we have a
new alternate rather than the last juror, assuming that
everybody, everybody survives till --
THE COURT:  Well, let's do this.  You can talk about
it.  I just wanted to bring your attention now.  And I'll keep
trying to watch and take breaks.  I did it yesterday to have
them stand up and I'll continue to do it, but I just wanted to
bring it to everyone's attention.
MR. MACK:  Thank you.  I hadn't noticed that
honestly, but I will --
THE COURT:  Well, it's probably your view.  But I had
my clerk tell me that yesterday and I watched her.  And like I
say, it's the reason I stopped and had them all stand up at one
point yesterday.  And like I say, today she just keeps closing
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her eyes and her head rocks back and forth.  She's clearly
falling asleep.
MR. MACK:  Is that -- I'm not sure who 16 is.
THE COURT:  It's the older lady in the -- she has
kind of white hair.
MR. MACK:  Is she the one that asked for the people
to speak up?
THE COURT:  Yes.
MR. MACK:  Okay.
THE COURT:  Yes.  All right.  Let's take a break.
MR. FALCONE:  Thank you, Judge.
(Recess taken by the court.)
THE COURT:  For the record, let me tell you this.
Again, the defendant is here.  I am going to dismiss Juror
No. 16.  I'm going to do it at the end of the morning.  Sitting
here, I've sat there and thought about it.  I've had input from
both of my staff, Shane my clerk, as well as Shante, who has
seen her sleeping for a significant period of time.
MR. MACK:  Okay.
THE COURT:  And she was obviously falling asleep
here.  I just don't know a way to survive that and have the
trial go as it needs to go and have someone who is missing that
amount of time.
MR. MACK:  Judge, if I can make a record.  We -- I
haven't noticed this and I'm not saying those observations
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aren't accurate, but I do know that in many of the trials that
I've done, I've seen jurors nodding off on occasion.  We
would -- and I think -- and I don't know if this extends beyond
today, but if it's just today --
THE COURT:  Well --
MR. MACK:  -- starting these videos, I don't know
that's a crucial, critical thing --
THE COURT:  An let me help you with that, because it
happened yesterday.  And again, talking to those people who
were with me up on the stand, they saw her up to about five
minutes asleep.
MR. MACK:  Okay.  
THE COURT:  I saw her asleep yesterday as well.  And
that's the reason I had them stand yesterday because she was --
she was asleep.
MR. MACK:  Okay.
THE COURT:  So it's not just one day.  It's two days.
And it's over a significant period of time.
MR. MACK:  Okay.  And just for the record, we would
object to it.  But is your plan then -- I'm sorry.  You said
after today's session?
THE COURT:  Yes, what I thought, we have about
another hour today.  And so what I thought we'd do is conclude
the trial.  I'll have her remain and then I'll excuse her.  I
didn't want to stick her on the spot.
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MR. MACK:  Yeah.
THE COURT:  Okay.
MR. MACK:  All right.  Thank you.
MR. COOLEY:  You said adjourn the trial.  You mean
adjourn for the day?
THE COURT:  Adjourn for the day.  Yeah.  Okay.
Anything else?  Can we bring the jury?
MR. MACK:  I think we're ready.
MR. COOLEY:  Yeah.
THE COURT:  All right.
THE BAILIFF:  All rise for the jury.
Please be seated.
THE COURT:  All right.  Let's have the witness resume
the stand.  Or standing where he was, either one.
I guess I need to ask the jury these questions,
though, as you get up and get prepared.
Did anyone talk to anyone or let anyone talk to you
about the case?  If so, raise your hand.
And I need that TV moved for just a minute.  Would
you pull it toward you, Officer.
Did anyone send or receive electronic communications
about the case?  If so, raise your hand.
Did anyone seek or obtain or get outside information
from the internet or other courses?  If so, raise your hand.
Did anyone talk to parties, witnesses, show your
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THE BAILIFF:  All rise for the jury.
THE COURT:  If you would remain in the courtroom.
Stay here.
JUROR:  I will.
THE COURT:  All right.
MR. MACK:  Judge, can we approach?
THE COURT:  Yes.  Please be seated.
(Following is discussion held at sidebar.) 
MR. MACK:  So I just wanted to embellish the record a
little bit, but I'm wondering, though -- well, I just want -- I
don't want her to necessarily go because I see her taking
notes.  I see her trying to pay attention.  And I wonder if
maybe an admonishment or a question, even a question of her if
she feels like she hasn't -- she's missed some parts or
something before she's just dismissed.
MR. COOLEY:  I think it would be appropriate to ask
her -- I'm sure she knows that she's been drifting off to
engage.  She feels whether it changes anybody's mind --
THE COURT:  I'm still going to dismiss her.
[inaudible]
MR. MACK:  Okay.
THE COURT:  [inaudible]
(End of sidebar discussion)
THE COURT:  Ma'am, I am going to let you go from the
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you've been.  I've seen that.  Unfortunately, I've also watched
you fall asleep a couple of times.  And it is just so important
that you see and hear all that occurs here.  Rather than
causing an error to be in this trial, I'm being a little more
cautious and so I will relieve you of jury service.  So you're
done, but thank you very much for your efforts.
JUROR:  Thank you.
THE COURT:  All right.
THE BAILIFF:  All rise for the jury.
MR. MACK:  Judge, can we just at least make a
inquiry?  I think that needs to be done for the record.
THE COURT:  Well --
MR. MACK:  If she's -- I think it should also be
pointed out when the Court asked her to remain back, she got up
to leave with the rest of the jury and had to be told a couple
of times by the juror seated next to her, no.  He actually
asked her to remain.
THE COURT:  Well, let me tell you why I decided to go
ahead and do it.  You recall I brought that up before the
break.  At the break I timed it that way because she was -- she
was falling asleep.  And what I saw specifically is her look
up, close her eyes, and then the head kind of nod forward, and
it happened repeatedly.  And finally, I was concerned about
going any further because of what she was clearly missing.
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assistants, from my clerk and from Shante, both of whom watched
her yesterday.  In fact, I got a note about it yesterday that
she was falling asleep.  I tried to observe it and saw it
myself.  And again, I had to call and try to get them all up,
to stand up and shake it off.  I did that because -- for her.
This wasn't just one time where she just kind of
dozed off for a minute.  And I agree that she was trying to be
a diligent juror, but all three of us saw it multiple times
during significant parts of the trial.  And it just got to be
such a point that I cannot allow -- allow her to go forward.
She has missed a significant amount.  It doesn't matter at this
point whether she knows that she missed it or not.  The fact is
that I observed her and my staff observed her missing
significant parts of the trial.  I just have to make the call
on that.  And that's the reason for my decision.
MR. MACK:  I understand, Judge.  If I could just add
a little bit --
THE COURT:  Go ahead.
MR. MACK:  -- to our objection.  Our objection
previously was we did not necessarily -- we did not want to
have her released.  I mean, we strategically selected her.  We
wanted her to be on this jury.
And I would just note that at the bench conference,
Mr. Cooley and I, before the juror was dismissed, suggested to
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well, at least to ascertain how much she thought she maybe
missed or how many times she maybe was asleep, if she was able
to take notes or just to evaluate herself.  That's all.  I mean
we made that request.  I understand the Court's ruling, but
that would be our objection.
THE COURT:  All right.  And thank you.  And again,
the reason as I didn't do that is because it hit the point that
it was just obvious and that it was clear that she missed a
significant amount.  And frankly, it wasn't going to be very
persuasive to me if she was aware that she missed, because she
clearly missed it and because she was asleep.
I would note from the record, when I told her that it
was because she was asleep, she just nodded in the affirmative
and let it go at that.  So anyway.  We'll --
MR. MACK:  If you see me sleeping this afternoon,
will you just let me go -- tomorrow.  Tomorrow.
THE COURT:  I will have a crowded courtroom in an
hour.  So if you could take care of your things so they will
not be disturbed.  Again, I offer the use of the closet if
anybody wants a briefcase or stack paper in there.
We'll be in recess and adjourned until 9:00 tomorrow
morning.
MR. FALCONE:  Thank you, Judge.
MR. COOLEY:  Thank you.
(Court was adjourned at 11:55 a.m.)
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